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Changing the engine while
flying
The incumbent telco dilemma hinges upon 4 different factors.
First and foremost, the financial pressure that they have to face
is tremendous. Despite the outstanding turnarounds undertaken
by most of these companies, most of them remain very vulnerable
because of the huge debt that they have gathered. Secondly, the
pressure on their core revenues is also tremendous due to the
fact that the prices for their core activities are going down
at a very fast pace. On the one hand, regulatory demands on the
lowering of interconnection prices are increasingly stronger.
On the other hand, end prices are naturally eroding because of
the commoditisation of such services (classic product life cycle
issue). Thirdly, clients are putting pressure on telcos for them
to lower their prices (mostly B2B clients) and reduce their telecom
spend as well as demanding faster and better ROI’s. Lastly, shareholders
are increasingly demanding in terms of innovation and new product
investments.
This is exactly where the biggest problem lies. Such new products
and services imply heavy investments in R&D and infrastructure
and their results may not be visible immediately (see Metcalfe’s
magic quadrant on page 2). This is why incumbent telcos have to
bolster creativity and innovation, in order to improve operational
results, without threatening the financial equilibrium which has
just been reinstated. Keeping the balance right is very difficult.
Cisco’s IBSG[92] consultants coined the
following phrase to describe this situation: Changing the Engine
while flying. Indeed, this is just as if we were asking Lindberg
to replace his old propeller engine for a new jet in the middle
of the Atlantic Ocean – certainly not easy
Growth
& diversification
This unusual situation for telcos will entice them to try and
cover the whole spectrum telecom products and services, whether
it be new lines of services or new markets and a combination of
those. Three main strategic options are available to them: Firstly,
to increase their penetration on their existing markets, namely
through the globalisation of their presence (against all odds,
France Télécom emerges as the champion in that area with 41% of
its revenue generated abroad, versus only 11% at British Telecom[95];
secondly, to up sell new value-added services or even by selling
new services or products outside their core business activities
like Internet services or even fully-fledged integration services;
thirdly, to move into outsourcing and/or out-tasking services,
which enable telcos to generate recurring revenues (typically
over 7 or 5-year periods).
The reason why going out of the Internet bubble years became
so difficult for telcos was their choice to diversify at full
speed outside of their core-business, and therefore indulging
a record buying spree involving the buyout of new technologies,
new people and new companies, not to mention worldwide expansion.
All was not bad in that strategy but the impact of bad choices
was so huge that it implied the systematic denial and rejection
of any kind of strategy vaguely negating the ‘core-business’ diktat.
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